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ABSTRACT Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are increasingly expected to operate in
spaces populated by humans while avoiding injury to people or damaging property. However, incidents
and accidents can, and increasingly do, happen. Traditional investigations of aircraft incidents require
on-board flight data recorders (FDRs); however, these physical FDRs only work if the drone can be
recovered. A further complication is that physical FDRs are too heavy to mount on light drones, hence
not suitable for forensic digital investigations of drone flights. In this paper, we propose a self-adaptive
software architecture, LiveBox, to make drones both forensic-ready and regulation compliant.We studied
the feasibility of using distributed technologies for implementing the LiveBox reference architecture.
In particular, we found that updates and queries of drone flight data and constraints can be treated as
transactions using decentralised ledger technology (DLT), rather than a generic time-series database, to
satisfy forensic tamper-proof requirements. However, DLTs such as Ethereum, have limits on throughput
(i.e. transactions-per-second), making it harder to achieve regulation-compliance at runtime. To overcome
this limitation, we present a self-adaptive reporting algorithm to dynamically reduce the precision of flight
data without sacrificing the accuracy of runtime verification. Using a real-life scenario of drone delivery,
we show that our proposed algorithm achieves a 46% reduction in bandwidth without losing accuracy in
satisfying both tamper-proof and regulation-compliant requirements.
INDEX TERMS Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones), Software Engineering, Self-Adaptive Systems,
Forensic Readiness, Flight Data Recorders, Simulators, Unmanned Traffic Management
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are increas-
ingly expected to operate in spaces populated by humans,
while avoiding injury to people and damage to property. In
the USA alone, the number of drones is predicted to reach
7.5 million by 2020, and with global companies like Amazon
testing them to deliver goods to households, the (UK) Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA) has begun to identify issues with
regulatory compliance.
Drones must also respect the privacy of people on the
ground, and avoid restricted spaces such as those occupied
by civilian aircraft or sensitive sites. However, incidents and
accidents can, and increasingly do, happen, e.g. on 16 Octo-
ber 20171. According to the UK Airprox Board [1], more
1D. Lee, ’Drone collides with a commercial aeroplane’, BBC News
near-miss incidents are caused by drones than by aircraft,
leading to a “new law for UK users to sit safety tests”2. The
traditional method for investigating an aircraft incident is to
examine the flight data recorders (FDRs). For drones, this
is challenging because the FDRs are too heavy and do not
provide real-time data. FDRs also require physical access to
the drone, which may not be available when carrying out an
investigation into a drone which has flown away.
The following real world scenario highlights several of our
research challenges.
Scenario. Transport for London (TfL) is considering the
deployment of drones to deliver medical assets such as blood
and organs between hospitals. In the past, blue-light vehicles
2UK drone users to sit safety tests under new law, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-42126150
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were used by the London Ambulance Service to deal with
such medical emergencies. Blood and organs need to be
delivered efficiently and reliably, which is not always viable
in a traffic-congested mega city. Therefore, motor-bikes are
often used instead. Cost aside, motor-bikes are noisy and one
of the causes of traffic accidents. The use of drones for this
purpose has therefore been proposed. However, when drone-
related incidents happen, they must be analysed quickly,
including checks for their compliance to the regulations of
the airspace they navigated.
The above scenario illustrates the challenges in satisfying
two key requirements:
• Forensic-soundness: Digital evidence collected must
be tamper-proof by design, admissible in court, and ac-
curate enough to avoid errors in forensic investigations;
• Regulation-compliance: The evidence must be capable
of being used to demonstrate whether or not a drone has
violated current regulations.
To address these challenges, in this paper we propose a
distributed software architecture called ‘LiveBox’. In ad-
dition to satisfying the above two core forensic-readiness
requirements, several non-functional requirements are also
critical. The LiveBox services must be scalable to handle
large volumes of sensor data that will be collected, as well
as resilient in the face of accidental, environmental or in-
tentional interference in collection and handling of the data
needed to investigate incidents. The integrity of the data and
subsequent analysis must be robust, even in the absence of
mutual trust between the stakeholders involved.
To provide an uninterrupted forensic-ready LiveBox ser-
vice, self-adaptation mechanisms need to perform the ac-
tivities that form a MAPE-K feedback loop: monitoring
(M), analysis (A), planning (P), and execution (E), around
situation-awareness knowledge (K). This knowledge is part
of the forensic evidence collected.
The novel contribution of LiveBox in this paper is the
representation of flight data of drones as tamper-proof
blockchain ledgers, and the verification of the consensus
of these flight data through a self-adaptive reporting algo-
rithm using locality-sensitive hashes and making situation-
aware decisions on demand. Overall, a smart contract-based
blockchain representation of flight data enables recovery of
the knowledge about drone flight records as tamper-proof
evidence; a self-adaptive reporting algorithm on board mon-
itors the distance between the drone and the zone boundary,
analyses an approximate geolocation to report with minimal
digits, plans for skipping certain reports when current sit-
uation can be inferred, and executes minimal reporting in-
structions without sacrificing the two core forensic-readiness
requirements.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
presents a reference architecture of LiveBox to address the
two core requirements: forensic soundness and regulation
compliance. Section III illustrates the basic research problem
through some pilot studies and indicates why a self-adaptive
solution is needed. Section IV proposes and evaluates a
blockchain smart contract and a self-adaptive reporting al-
gorithm to address the technical challenges in achieving both
requirements for real-life drone forensic readiness scenarios.
Section V discusses related work, and Section VI summarises
our findings.
FIGURE 1. LiveBox Software Reference Architecture
II. LIVEBOX REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
Our proposed reference software architecture for LiveBox
is shown in Figure 1. It comprises three kinds of software
services:
(i) On-drone LiveBox Services. Captures flight data from
various physical sensors and receivers with situation
awareness of other drones through automatic dependent
surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) [2]. This live data is
cached locally and communicated as streams of time-
critical data to the LiveBox cloud service, preserving
privacy when possible;
(ii) The LiveBox Cloud Service. Allows stakeholders to
specify no-fly zones as constraints, against which drones
are checked during forensic investigations. The trusted
storage solution uses Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT) as a scalable, tamper-proof, and reliable way
of handling forensic investigation or regulation compli-
ance queries;
(iii) LiveBox Ground Service. Uses additional sensors of
mobile or fixed ground stations to capture signals of
drones, whether or not they have on-drone LiveBox
services. This flight data is also communicated to the
LiveBox Cloud Service to cross-validate the behaviour
of drones. When a drone violates regulations due to
emerging failure conditions (e.g., changing weather, lost
connection, or temporary no-fly zones), a notification
is sent to a LiveBox compatible drone controller for
intervention and also used by other LiveBox services to
adaptively enhance forensic data collection.
To support all such communications requires protocols to
support forensic analysis of live flight data, on or off the
drones. Such protocols, however, are beyond the scope of this
paper.
Focusing on the software engineering characteristics of
LiveBox, two research challenges need to be addressed:
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RC1 Collecting and storing drone flight data, in real-time,
through a distributed mechanism, enabling forensically
sound investigations;
RC2 Live forensic analysis of flight data to check compliance
with regulations such as ‘no-fly’, ’flight corridor’, or
‘privacy zone’ zones, or non-compliance with the ‘line
of sight’ rules for drone operations;
III. FROM LIVE BLACKBOX TO LIVEBOX
Since LiveBox is a complex system that extends beyond
software services, it is infeasible for us to demonstrate a
holistic solution (including hardware) yet. However, with
respect to the key properties and requirements, we can report
preliminary findings through pilot experiments that illustrate
the feasibility of our approach.
Live blackbox [3] was a pilot study we conducted to check
the feasibility of achieving five tracking and verification
requirements with respect to logging aircraft data, namely,
Tracking, Prediction, Scalability, Verification, and Liveness.
Tracking concerns collecting flight data from aircraft, Pre-
diction concerns sufficient accuracy in knowing the next
location of aircraft, Scalability concerns doing these at the
global scale with thousands of aircraft, Verification concerns
the capability to tell whether an aircraft is within normal
boundary or not, and Liveness concerns the timely, live
update of such flight data and the services [4] to forensic
investigators. Furthermore, to accommodate the ephemeral
nature of flights, we also considered Snap forensics require-
ments to bound the liveness by expiry timestamps [5].
In addition to these findings, it is worth emphasising that
drone forensics requires the LiveBox data to be tamper-
proof, while our preliminary Live Blackbox study assumed it
from properties of blackbox hardware, without any additional
software measures in place to enforce it.
As drones are different from aircraft in terms of limited
battery capacity (most drones can fly no longer than 30 min-
utes per session), limited communication distances (usually
ADS-B is not used except for very high-end drones), higher
update frequency (usually in seconds rather than in minutes),
etc., one cannot take for granted that a Live Blackbox solu-
tion is sufficient for the proposed LiveBox. In the following,
we describe a number of pilot experiments we conducted to
test how feasible it is to implement each LiveBox sub-service
proposed. Later on, we will also discuss the limitations in
these pilot studies to achieve the vision of self-adaptive live
boxes.
A. REAL-WORLD PROBLEMS AND PILOT STUDIES
Many high profile ‘near-miss’ incidents have been logged
by the UK Airprox Board (see e.g. [1]). These are quali-
tative records when pilots or someone on board an aircraft
report to an authority (e.g., CAA) about an object, such as
a bird or an unidentified drone, that flies by dangerously.
Despite the tightening safety standards, one can see from the
trends over the last 20 years that the number of incidents
has started to climb in recent years (see Figure 2a), and
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 2. Statistics w.r.t. drone-caused incidents in UK
the growth is, unfortunately, accelerating for drone-related
incidents (Figure 2b). These phenomena are an international
concern recognised, for example, by the FAA in the USA
and the ICAO in Canada – in a recent incident on 17 October
2017, an 8-passenger aircraft in Quebec was actually hit by a
drone3.
In addition, regulator constraints with respect to aircraft
safety have been imposed on the drone pilots, through the
development of an official app ‘Drone Assist’ by NATS and
Altitude Angel. Figure 3 illustrates a location-based plot of
the no-fly zones, with different colours indicating the risk
levels if a violation occurs. As one can see, geometrical
boundaries of the no-fly zone regions are not always circular.
Their shape can be irregular in the case of, for example,
prisons and other points of interests. A pilot is required to
restrict their flights to areas outside these boundaries.
When it comes to a metropolitan city such as London, the
no-fly zones can be congested and overlapping, as shown in
Figure 4. However, that does not mean it is impossible to fly
a drone there, because not all no-fly zones are in force at all
times for everyone. For example, the London Metropolitan
Police has been allowed to send surveillance drones to sites
like London bridge at night, or any time when buildings such
as Grenfell Tower in London4 were on fire when residents
inside needed to be rescued.
3http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-41635518
4https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-40272168
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FIGURE 3. No-fly zones highlighted for drone pilots
Flight data can also be misreported, even though they
might have been captured automatically. Figure 5a shows
the status of a Parrot Bebop2 drone in terms of connectivity,
GPS availability, battery levels, and crash status. In this view,
several ‘crash’ events are in fact just normal landings in a
grass field. Figure 5b gives a satellite view of the flight path,
where different segments of the path are plotted along with
the two nodes indicating the "Start" and "End" of the journey.
It is worth noting that the GPS locations, when available, do
not necessarily require the storage of satellite images because
they can be pinned to the satellite images later. Figure 5c
presents the plots of individual parameters including altitude,
speed and battery percentages, all aligned with the time
stamps. As long as such data cross-validate, their internal
integrity (with respect to physical law compliance) could be
checked using differential equations. However, storing the
flight data of drones on the controller (mobile phones in this
case) is no guarantee of tamper-proof integrity. It is possible
to tamper with such data by replacing the files on the devices
once attackers know where the database files are accessible.
B. ON-DRONE DATA COLLECTION AND
INSTRUMENTATION
To check whether drones without GPS sensors (e.g., Parrot
AR Drone 2.0) could still have accessible flight data, we
used an open-source Image Forensic tool EXIF5 to extract
5https://www.sno.phy.queensu.ca/~phil/exiftool
FIGURE 4. Congested no-fly zones in Central London and the Need for a
Flight Corridor to medical delivery
TABLE 1. Flight data retrieved from videos using EXIF tool
18 4 195.551 -0.105 -0.077 -2.426 3.632
18 4 195.584 -0.084 -0.074 -2.415 3.645
... (2647 more rows omitted) ...
detailed data videos stored on the drone in MPEG format.
Table 1 shows a snapshot of such records below (the floating
point numbers are already rounded up to 3 digits, where the
exact number is much more precise). The first column is the
percentage of battery, the second is a number indicating the
discrete status (0=unknown, 1=initiated, 2=landed, 3/7=fly-
ing, 4=hovering, 5/6=taking off, 8=landing, 9=looping, etc.),
the third, fourth, fifth columns are rotation degrees, in terms
of Yaw, Roll, and Pitch and the last column is the altitude in
metres.
When a drone is not flying, commercial tools such as
Oxygen Drone Forensics kit could also be used to recover
flight data from the memory chips and SD-cards. However,
when a drone is flying and one would like to obtain live
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(a)
(b)
(c)
FIGURE 5. Different types of flight data recorded by FreeFlight
streamed data, it is possible to carry a mobile SIM card
with telecommunication chips with the drone, to track their
movement using a LiveBox cloud service.
C. LIVEBOX CLOUD SERVICE
There are many ways to implement the LiveBox cloud
service; e.g., using a centralised server on the Internet, or
distributed ground devices to pick up the signals on the
volunteering basis. Both the OpenSky and FlightRadar24 net-
works record air traffic data with ADS-B radar transponders
if they communicate with a networked node.
However, it has been reported that OpenSky and Fligh-
tRadar24 do not capture the same datasets, and it is possible
to do an insertion attack to report fake flight data into the net-
work. Currently, both OpenSky and FlightRadar24 services
do not have a way to distinguish the truthful flight data from
the false ones.
Blockchains are known to be tamper-proof, in the sense
that to modify the consensus reached previously, it would
require more than 50% of all the mining power, which is
almost impossible in reality when there are a large number
of decentralised nodes.
Public ledgers, such as Bitcoin, offer a possible stor-
age medium for the flight data. However, more specialist
blockchain technology capable of running smart contracts;
e.g., Ethereum and Neo, are better suited to both data storage
and retrieval.
IV. SELF-ADAPTIVE FORENSIC READINESS
In this section, we propose a feasible solution to provide
forensic ready LiveBox services by evaluating alternatives in
distributed technology and self-adaptation.
A. TAMPER-PROOF TO PROVIDE DATA INTEGRITY
If the data reported could be modified or tampered with, the
intelligence would not be treated as forensically sound evi-
dence, as indicated by the research challenge (RC1). There-
fore, we formulate the following research question (RQ) to
evaluate various flight data storage mechanisms against the
tamper-proof property.
RQ1 When the flight data are live streamed, can they be
tampered with to change the verification results?
In experiments we compared two mechanisms for live data
streaming including time-series distributed databases such
as InfluxDB [6], which is specialised to record Internet
of Things (IoT) data for efficient and scalable handling
of time-series queries; and blockchain technology such as
Ethereum [7]–[9], which uses a distributed ledger to store
transactions.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume in our evaluation that
the reported locations are the same as those detected on board
the drones.
To evaluate a mechanism by the tamper-proof property, we
launch two kinds of attacks against it:
• inject false locations into the data records and remove
true locations;
• inject false zone constraints into the data records and
remove true zone constraints;
Only if both kinds of data injection attack fail, can the
mechanism be used for our forensic readiness solution.
For InfluxDB, by inserting false locations post-mortem,
that is, inserting the record of a geolocation with a time
stamp older than a previously recorded event, we found
that tampering is possible. Even worse, a query of the
flight path after such an insertion attack would show the
inserted geolocation as if it had occurred earlier. Similarly,
the zone constraints key-value pairs can also be inserted
post-mortem, while subsequent queries cannot distinguish
them from the genuine transactions. Even though InfluxDB
is highly efficient at querying and updating time-series data
(in our batch experiment the transaction rate peaked above
10000 per second), we found it an infeasible solution to
satisfy the tamper-proof requirement and the validity of the
recorded data could be questioned if one cannot eliminate
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the possibility of injection attacks. In contrast, the rate of
transaction with Ethereum is reported 15 per second 6, which
is the cost paid for higher-level integrity. However, one could
package multiple FDR into one transaction to alleviate the
situation.
We have also launched injection attacks against our
Ethereum smart contract deployed to the Ethereum test net-
work Rinkeby. Since the smart contract transaction times-
tamps are recorded as part of the blockchain ledger using
crypto hashes, an injected transaction would raise an in-
consistency between the time-stamp of drone position and
the time-stamp of the blockchain transaction. Therefore, a
transaction cannot be inserted post-mortem, eliminating the
possibility of either inserting (resp. removing) a false (resp.
true) flight data record or zone constraint record.
Under normal conditions the public Ethereum network is
capable of verifying a transaction within 15 seconds, given
that there is sufficient incentive for the miners (or signers in
Ethereum speak) to include the transaction into the current
block. As shown in Figure 4 we have deployed a smart
contract on the Ethereum Rinkeby test network, where trans-
actions have been executed to record the flight data. 1.
Since Ethereum handles incoming transactions as a
pipeline, the overall throughput can be larger than 15 seconds
per transaction because the incoming transactions in a queue
are periodically processed into the block in a batch, even
though an individual transaction may take up to 15 seconds
to be verified. In the worst case scenario, high frequency
updates for an individual drone, would result in queuing
up unverified transactions for that drone. Whilst a trust-less
public blockchain may not meet such needs of high frequency
update, there are alternative private blockchain solutions
one can utilise. In this work, we assume that the update
frequency per drone can be accommodated by Ethereum-
like blockchains using a self-adaptive reporting mechanism
described in the next subsection.
Using smart contracts (written in the Solidity program-
ming language) in Ethereum, we have achieved a prelimi-
nary implementation to store the data on Table 1 into the
distributed ledger.
While blockchain ledgers were initially designed for finan-
cial transactions, smart contracts have enabled them to be
used for a wide range of applications. We are making use
of them for recording the movement of drones in the cyber-
physical airspace. By ‘cyber-physical airspace’, we mean that
the spatial locations may not be the ‘exact places’ to which
one can associate interpretable semantics [10]. For example,
the safety implication is significantly different if the reported
GPS location is near to airports or prisons, rather than an
open field where no harm could be done to aircraft or people.
Furthermore, the same physical location may have different
connotations depending on the misuse cases of drones (e.g.,
near-misses or drug deliveries). The key point here is to settle
the analogous ‘double-spending’ disputes in the terminology
6https://www.coindesk.com/information/will-ethereum-scale
of distributed ledgers, where blockchains are designed to
verify this by proof-of-work or proof-of-stake consensus
protocols. In the case of near-miss incidents, the same drone
cannot appear in more than one partitioned airspaces at any
given time; in the case of drug deliveries, airspace around a
prison may be treated differently during daylight than during
the night.
B. SELF-ADAPTIVE REPORTING ALGORITHM
Due to inevitable communication delays of the LiveBox
verification, a key to achieving self-adaptation is to build a
prediction model based on the previously built ones. This is
articulated as the following research question to address the
regulation-compliance research challenge (RC2) timely.
RQ2 How accurate do geolocations need to be to tell pre-
cisely whether a drone is inside or outside a zone?
Drones on the move in physical space have a certain degree
of continuity. Let τ be the time interval between geolocation,
and the drone is located at L(t) at the time t where L
can be some dimension of the geolocation such as latitude,
longitude, or altitude. The new location L(t + τ) at the time
t + τ should satisfy (L(t + τ) − L(t))/τ ≤ v, where v is
the maximum speed of the drone, there exists a maximum
distance that a drone can travel away away from its current
location L(t) for a known time interval.
Our basic concept of self-adaptive reporting is illustrated
in Figure 7. Given an irregularly-shaped flight corridor
through an area that is completely enclosed by a "no fly
zone", we first check whether a drone at a marked geolocation
at a given (numbered) time stamp is inside or outside the
flight corridor. We report an approximate location within an
error circle around the exact location so that one can always
tell from the reported location if the drone is inside or outside
the flight corridor.
The level of precision is adaptively selected for each geolo-
cation based on its distance from the flight corridor boundary
to ensure that its circumference never intersects the boundary
of the flight corridor. If a non-adaptive approximation is used
it would be possible for the error boundary to intersect with
the flight corridor and the no fly zone.
For example, in-between the two London hospitals St
Thomas and Guys, a flight corridor is defined by the area
mainly above the Thames River, which is relatively safer to
retrieve a fallen drone, see Figure 8. For a given flight path,
see Figure 9, the reported locations of the drone may be
inside or outside the corridor. Their distance to the boundary
of the corridor is indicated by a circle. If one reports any
position inside the circle, the verification results would be
guaranteed to be the same as reporting the exact location of
the drone.
The reason for not reporting the exact location here is to
reduce the bandwidth and the delay for live streaming, which
has been identified as a bottleneck to adopt tamper-proof
blockchain technology in the evaluation of RQ1.
The radius of the reported circle is adaptable so that it is
less likely to come to a wrong conclusion from the reports.
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FIGURE 6. Flight data transacted on Ethereum Rinkeby network
FIGURE 7. Illustration of self-adaptive reporting on compliance to a flight
corridor
Similarly, when the marker is inside the zone, one can adapt
the report precision so that it remains accurate with respect
to whether the drone is inside or outside of a boundary.
The second adaptable parameter is the frequency of report-
ing. One has to be careful though because by adjusting the
time intervals between two consecutive reports, it is possible
to deduce incorrect conclusions. As shown in Figure 7, the
markers not reported may contain a violation to the flight
corridor. By counting how many markers may be wrongly
reported, it is possible to calculate the maximum possible
interval that maintains compliance to the flight corridor.
Returning to the TfL drone flight scenario, increasing the
intervals from reporting every 30 seconds to every 2 minutes,
fewer way-points will be communicated, see Figure 10. Even
when all of them are within the flight corridor, it is still not
necessarily true that the entire journey has been compliant to
the zone constraints.
To develop a self-adaptive algorithm to adjust the re-
porting accuracy, we created a feedback loop to rounding
the locations to a tolerable precision, depending on their
distances to the boundary of no-fly/flight corridor zones Z7.
In other words, one would like to maintain a certain level of
predictability so that for any given time t, the drone is safely
outside a no-fly zone (resp. inside a flight corridor), i.e.:
P (L(t) ∈ Z) < θ (1)
where θ is a threshold close to zero to indicate the error
tolerance level.
Taking into account the current location and the spatial
continuity and proximity, the criteria can be rewritten as:
P (L′(t) ∈ Z) < θ =⇒ P (L(t+ τ) ∈ Z) < θ (2)
where L′(t) is the location of the drone reported previously,
which may not be as accurate as physical location in reality
L(t).
To test the verification correctness with required pre-
dictability in adaptation, we introduce multiple levels of
noise in the reporting function. Given a trajectory of drone
flight locations (i.e., a flight path) and a zone, by reducing
the accuracy of the reported locations, one can observe
how likely the verification fails to report any non-fly zone
violation of drone flights.
In the following experiment, we have generated 100
flight paths using a software the simulators Dronology [12],
Dragonfly [13], [14] and a specialised airspace editing tool
ArduPilot8. Here is a basic algorithm to check compli-
ance of zone by the geolocations on the flight paths of a
7Rounding is a simple form of a general class of locality-sensitive hash
algorithms [11]
8http://ardupilot.org
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duration T , which provides a a probabilistic answer to each
flight path:
P (L(t) ∈ Z) = |L(iτ) ∈ Z|/(T/τ). (3)
For a compliance threshold θ, one obtains a boolean to
tell whether the flight corridor is followed. For self-adaptive
reporting of the compliance check results, the monitor takes
into account the nearest distance to the boundary d to adjust
the interval τ .
There are also several strategies to choose in self-reporting.
E.g., the approximation function L′ (e.g., how many decimal
digits one uses in reporting the locations). According to
the theory of locality-sensitive hashes, approximation may
not reduce the accuracy of reporting with respect to the
verification results.
C. EVALUATION ON REAL-LIFE SCENARIOS
First, we chose a flight path and a flight corridor informed
by TfL and NHS Blood, as mentioned in the scenario of
Section I. The scenario requires the delivery of emergency
medical assets including blood and organs between three
hospitals, St. Thomas (T) Hospital near the Waterloo Sta-
tion, St Bartholomew Hospital (B), and Guys Hospital (G).
Straightline distance between each pair of the three hospitals
is less than 5km, while the road travel time each way is
typically 60 minutes due to traffic congestion.
In consultation with TfL drone experts, it is much safer
to fly drones over the water because it may be less likely
to hit someone on the ground. With this in mind, the flight
corridor is defined to maximise the use of the waterfront on
the Thames, while trying to take off and land the drones on
helicopter pads or green parks near the sending and receiving
ends of the deliveries. Figure 8 shows a flight corridor be-
FIGURE 8. A flight corridor between St Thomas and Guys hospitals
tween T (lat=51.49828, lon=-0.12007) and G (lat=51.50378,
lon=-0.08734), utilising the waterfront, which is defined by a
blue polygon enclosed the zone on the map. The blue markers
on the map also show a possible flight path from T to G.
When the marker is outside the polygon it is considered
violating the flight corridor. Figure 9 shows a problematic
FIGURE 9. Checking compliance of a flight path against the corridor
flight path between T and G. If all the markers are inside the
corridor (see Figure 8, it would be a perfect journey, cutting
the time required from 60 minutes down to 20 minutes.
However, some of the markers went out of the flight corridor,
hence may cause safety and privacy damages.
By increasing the intervals, some waypoints will not be
reported, which might decrease the accuracy of verification.
For example, Figure 10 shows a reported flight path by 5
times bigger intervals: although all of points were inside the
flight corridor, in fact the report was erratic because some of
the skipped way points were in fact outside the corridor (cf.
Figure 9).
FIGURE 10. Increasing the intervals between way-points in a drone flight
By simulating random turbulence in 100 flight paths be-
tween T to G, Figures 11 and 12 shows the accumulated
error rates P (L(t) ∈ Z) of various configurations, which are
characterised by two adaptable reporting parameters, τ and
d.
The self-adaptive reporting solutions could adjust τ , d, or
both.
Let the probability of compliance P (L(t) ∈ Z) with the
minimal interval be an oracle, in our case, every τ = 15 sec-
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onds a way point. For the 20 minutes journey there were 80
way-points collected for each of the 100 flight paths between
T and G. When τ increases by a unit of 15 seconds, we show
the absolute error rates of |P (L′(t) ∈ Z)−P (L(t) ∈ Z)| on
the average of all the 100 drone flights in Figure 11. From
these data, the trend is clear that the absolute error rates
increases when the intervals increases in reporting flight data.
Next, when d are fixed to a certain constant value d0, i.e.,
reporting the truncated geolocation to a fixed precision no
matter the drone is far away from the boundary of the flight
corridor zone or not. In this case, one can see in Figure 12 that
the error rate of |P (L′(t) ∈ Z) − P (L(t) ∈ Z) increases,
almost in proportion to the accuracy thresholds (i.e. the
horizontal axis shows the distance threshold by multiplying a
unit of every 0.00005 degrees or 300m).
The self-adaptive reporting algorithm reports a more pre-
cise location only when the distance of the drone is closer
to the boundary, otherwise it reports a less precise location.
As a result, the error rates is reduced to zero, as shown in
Figure 12. In other words, any point selected from inside the
circle can approximate the exact location (i.e., the centre of
the circle) with respect to the verification queries.
Finally, putting the two self-adaptive parameters together
by considering both the increased intervals and the reduced
precisions in the algorithm, we estimate the bandwidth re-
quired for communicating fewer, less precise geolocations.
Figure 13 shows the number of digits required to report
the geolocations per way-point. We aim to use minimal
digits to approximate way points, while maintaining the
approximation to be within a given radius to the centre and
avoiding crossing the zone boundary. The vertical axis shows
the total number of digits required to store the approximate
geolocations. The horizontal axis shows the distance for
a non-adaptive algorithm to choose an approximate point
within that distance to the exact way points.
The distance, i.e. the radius of the circles centred around
the way points, is shown in Figure 7 by a unit of 0.00005
degree or 30m. The radius values range from zero for the
finest approximation to 39 × 0.000005 degree = 1200m for
the coarsest approximation, and the total number of digits
required for the decreasing precision would also decrease,
ranging from the maximum 64940 digits to the minimum
44336 digits.
As shown in Figure 12, on the other hand, using the self-
adaptive reporting algorithm on all the geolocations where
the approximation radius is adjusted according to the min-
imal distance to the zone boundary, the total number of
digits required would become 47804, which is a reduction
from 64940 by 46% compared to the non-adaptive reporting
algorithm of the same level of accuracy.
V. RELATED WORK
It is an active research area to elicit requirements and sketch
architectures for secure vehicles [15], including the Internet
of drones [16]. However, the problem of regulating drones
FIGURE 11. Climbing error rates of P (L′(t) ∈ Z) while increasing the
intervals between way-points in a drone flight
FIGURE 12. Increasing error rates of P (L′(t) ∈ Z) while decreasing the
precision of way-points in flight data reports; while self-adaptive distance
threshold can reduce the error rates to zero.
FIGURE 13. The total number of digits required to report the approximated
geolocations with respect to non-adaptive or self-adaptive (SA) precision
reporting strategies: SA reduces the bandwidth required by 46% from 64940
down to 44336 digits, while maintaining zero error rate.
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have specific requirements which also calls for specific ar-
chitectures.
A. DRONE SAFETY
Dronology is a metaphor to simulate the crowd of drones
through a combination of cyber and physical domain prop-
erties, such as airspaces, drone behavioural data, etc. [12].
Apart from simulation-based approaches [13], policies-
based [17] and autonomy [18] approaches have also been
proposed to control drone safety [19]. The goal of these
approaches is to identify critical safety hazards where drones
may collide with each other (i.e., collision avoidance), whilst
our goal is in forensic readiness, i.e., to track the drones and
log their situations as tamper-proof and reliable evidence for
forensic investigations [20].
For due diligence it is mandatory to be unbiased and
avoid any conflict of interests amongst stakeholders who do
not necessarily trust each other. In that sense, blockchains
technology seems to be an obvious choice, given their decen-
tralised and trust-less design.
B. BLOCKCHAINS
With respect to the LiveBox requirements, software-based
blockchain technology [5], [7], [8] already offers (1) scalable
verification of live streamed flight status and (2) regulation
of drone behaviour. In doing so, it can already address two
challenges of physical FDRs: software has no weight and
remote storage survives the destruction of drones, that is
why Ethereum was considered for writing smart contracts to
represent drone data [9].
However, they are not sufficient to address the forensic-
readiness problem because both Bitcoin and Ethereum proto-
cols cannot yet achieve the real-time verification requirement
economically (as indicated by our pilot experiments). Fur-
thermore, they need to establish a continuous communication
channel, which cannot be assumed for drones operating in
environments where communications are often intermittent.
Therefore, we propose to enhance DLT, among many pos-
sible choices of solutions, that allows forensically sound
caching of data until communications are re-established.
C. PROACTIVE VERSUS SELF-ADAPTIVE FORENSICS
Proactive forensics or forensic readiness has been proposed
to selectively log the evidence so long as the reasoning of
forensic claims is not affected [21]. However, there is a gap
between proactive and self-adaptive approaches to forensics.
In proactive forensic readiness, we aim to collect the data as
expected or predicted in order to establish or refute certain
given hypotheses defined beforehand. On the other hand, in
self-adaptive forensics, the amount of data we aim to collect
would depend on the context of the running system. The
case of the LiveBox self-adaptive reporting algorithm is such
an example. In this sense, the forensic-ready adaptation is
a special form of ‘cautious adaptation’ whereby the defiant
component adapts to the global needs (e.g., forensic readi-
ness) of the system of systems [22].
Compared to self-adaptive systems to deal with uncer-
tainty using feedback loops [23], our self-adaptive reporting
mechanism already knows how to deal with the adaptable pa-
rameters to the zone boundaries, i.e., a ‘set-point’ where the
observed and the predicted contextual factors are compared
at runtime to decide on which control actions to take in the
next step. In this paper, we identified two of such adaptable
parameters: the time interval and the distance to boundary.
Interval is a controllable parameter by the self-adaptive sys-
tem, while distance is a contextual factor parameter.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A “forensic ready” system is one that is able to, and does,
collect the information necessary to support the investigation
of an incident in which that system is subsequently involved.
A flight data recorder (a blackbox, for example), provides
such forensic readiness for an aircraft in case it is involved in
an accident. Drones cannot usually carry heavy blackboxes,
so alternatives are needed. As shown by our pilot studies
and simulations, the LiveBox service for implementing the
forensic-readiness requirements for drones is feasible. The
service is self-adaptive because the forensic evidence to be
collected is the result of a trade-off between the cost and the
benefits of alternatives and the associated risks.
In this paper, we evaluated two research questions using
a real-life scenario of emergency delivery of medical assets
using drones through a flight corridor along the Thames
River between two hospitals in London. When the flight data
was live streamed, we showed that it cannot be tampered
with when blockchain technology (such as a smart contract)
is used to record the flight data in a distributed ledger.
In contrast, traditional distributed database technology fails
to achieve the tamper-proof property required. However,
given that distributed ledger technology (especially public
blockchains) is limited in managing large throughput of
transactions for drone flight data, we investigated a self-
adaptive reporting algorithm to selectively disclose geolo-
cations at adaptable intervals and precision. Using our al-
gorithm, the probability to infer whether a drone is inside
or outside a zone does not change, while the total number
of digits required by the approximated geolocation is greatly
reduced. In a real-life case study, we showed such reduction
to be up to 46%, while a zero error rate in terms of the
verification results can still be achieved.
With these promising results, however, one must be aware
that forensic-readiness requirements are only part of the over-
all solution; that is, there is still a need to provide full security
life-cycle support for drone deployments, managing security
threats as appropriate, managing privacy concerns, and in-
vestigating forensically incidents of misuse or accident. To
achieve this in the future requires substantial collaboration by
a community of stakeholders including not only researchers,
but also law makers, law enforcement authorities, drone
vendors, and pilots themselves.
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